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ABSTRACT
A DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF DETECTING DECEPTION
FEBRUARY 1999
JAMES A. FORREST, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert S. Feldman
This study tests a proposed dual processing model that
suggests that cognitive processing style affects people's
accuracy in detecting deception. A videotaped sample of
target individuals, in which each target makes honest and
dishonest statements, was shown to ninety-one
participants, who judged each target's truthfulness.
Participants' distraction was manipulated in order to
promote effortful and uneffortful processing. It was
expected that participants exposed to low levels of
distraction would engage in effortful processing, while
those participants exposed to high levels of distraction
would engage in uneffortful processing. It was also
hypothesized that highly distracted people, who are
presumably engaging in uneffortful processing, would
attend more to nonverbal behaviors, while people in the
low distraction condition, who engage in more effortful
processing, would attend to the central (verbal) arguments
iii
of a message. Because nonverbal behaviors are most
revealing of deception, participants in the high
distraction condition were expected to show more accuracy
in distinguishing between honest and dishonest messages
compared to participants in the low distraction condition
The results of the study did not support this hypothesis,
possibly because the distraction manipulation for high
distraction participants may have been excessively
distracting. It was found that participants' recall of
the arguments presented to them in the video was
significantly related to their accuracy at detecting
deception. Specifically, a curvilinear relationship was
found, where people who had poor recollection of the
arguments, and those with high recall, were not as
accurate at detecting deception, compared to people with
average recall of arguments.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Research has found that detecting deceit is not an easy
task. For example, when attempting to distinguish between
people being honest and dishonest, judges' accuracy is
usually only slightly above chance levels (Kraut, 1980) . On
the other hand, nonverbal behaviors are fairly good
indicators of deceit (Ekman and O'Sullivan, 1991). Facial
expressions such as smiling (Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan,
1988), body movements and voice pitch (Ekman, Friesen, &
Scherer, 1976) have been empirically studied, and each has
been shown to be a predictor of actual deception.
Although DePaulo, Zuckerman, and Rosenthal (1980)
argued that the ability to detect lies is strongly
contingent on situational factors, Frank and Ekman (1997)
showed that good lie detectors are able to detect lies
across different high-stakes situations. In the Frank and
Ekman study, the same judges participated in two
experiments, viewing scenarios and judging deception in
those scenarios. It was found that judges' accuracy at
detecting deception in the first experiment predicted their
accuracy in the second experiment. The results of this
study suggest that there are strategies that people use
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across situations that help in detecting deception
accurately
.
Nonverbal Cues as Indicators of Deception
Nonverbal behaviors are readily perceived. For
example, an increase or decrease in voice pitch, body
movement, and smiling are all very easily noticed by a
casual observer. Furthermore, nonverbal behaviors are not
only easily detectable, but also happen to be the behaviors
that are most highly correlated with deception. DePaulo and
colleagues and Ekman and colleagues have investigated
behaviors such as smiling (Ekman et al, 1988) and voice
pitch (Ekman et al
.
, 1976), and they have established that
these nonverbal behaviors typically are more predictive of
deception than verbal behavior (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter,
1985)
.
Therefore, when attending to certain nonverbal cues,
judges' accuracy is likely to rise.
On the other hand, paying attention to the arguments,
thinking of counter-arguments, and verifying the logic of an
argument are all fairly complex tasks that require
considerable cognitive effort. It stands to reason then,
that judges who engage in this effortful processing are less
apt to attend to nonverbal cues that accompany a message,
and consequently are less likely to correctly identify
deception
.
Cognitive Processing and Attention to Nonverbal Cues
Surprisingly, little research has been done on how
people who are judging for deceptiveness process the verbal
message. However, the attitude change literature can
provide some clues as to the processes involved. Persuasion
research shows that people who are motivated and able to
scrutinize a message are likely to engage in effortful
processing and pay attention to the central arguments of
that message, while people who are not motivated or not able
to scrutinize a message will resort to peripheral processing
(Petty & Cacioppo, 198 6) . In peripheral or uneffortful
processing, people use cues inherent in the context of the
message to make attributions and judgments about that
message. Such peripheral cues are likely to encompass
nonverbal cues, which predict deception (Stiff, Miller,
Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick, and Rogan, 1989)
.
Furthermore, the processing style people engage in
predicts the type of cues people attend to when judging for
deceptiveness. Stiff et al. (1989) proposed the situational
familiarity hypothesis. This hypothesis states that people
in unfamiliar situations engage in uneffortful processing
because they have "little basis for evaluating the validity
of verbal content" (p. 560). Therefore, people shift their
attention to more readily accessible nonverbal cues. People
in familiar situations are said to be engaged in effortful
processing because they are able to "visualize" the
situation and therefore assess the plausibility and validity
of the verbal message.
In support of this reasoning, Stiff et al . (1989) found
that people judging for decept iveness in familiar situations
(i.e., effortful processing) paid attention to the verbal
aspects of a message while ignoring the visual components.
On the other hand, when the situation was not familiar
(i.e., uneffortful processing), people paid attention to
both the visual and, to some degree, the verbal aspects of
the message when judging for deceptiveness
. On the basis of
these results, it seems possible that in effortful
processing, people rely more on the verbal component of a
message to arrive at a judgment about deceptiveness, while
in uneffortful processing, people rely more on the nonverbal
cues. Therefore, when making judgements about
deceptiveness, people engaging in uneffortful processing may
have an advantage over those engaging in effortful
processing because during uneffortful processing they attend
more to the range of behaviors indicative of deception. In
short, people engaging in uneffortful processing should be
better at detecting deception than people engaging in
effortful processing.
The Dual Processing Model
Priester and Petty (1995) found that people who are
suspicious of deception are more likely to engage in
effortful processing than people who are not suspicious.
Because the task of detecting deception in the context of an
experiment inherently involves suspicion of the person being
judged, it would seem reasonable that judges will employ an
effortful processing style and pay particular attention to
the verbal aspect of a message. Furthermore, when the task
is personally relevant, central processing tends to become
stronger (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) . Conseguent ly , people
will pay even closer attention to central arguments of a
message, which actually have little or no predictive value.
In short, the suspiciousness involved in deception detection
and the relevance of the task would make judges engage in
more effortful processing, and as a result, people engaging
in effortful processing should show relatively poorer
accuracy in distinguishing between truthful and untruthful
messages .
On the other hand, when people are not motivated or
able to attend closely to the verbal aspect of a message,
they increase their attention to the nonverbal cues when
making a judgement about decept i veness . By increasing their
reliance on nonverbal cues, people attend to the range of
an
behaviors that will increase their chances of making
accurate judgement of decepti veness
. Hence, people engaging
in uneffortful processing should be better detectors of
deception than people engaging in effortful processing.
In support of this reasoning, Forrest and Feldman (in
press) asked judges, for whom the task was either personally
relevant or not personally relevant, to watch videotaped
samples consisting of people giving honest or dishonest
messages. After viewing each sample, they judged the
perceived sincerity of each target person's message.
The results of the study showed that, as predicted,
people who were highly involved in the task (i.e., more
motivated to scrutinize a message) where less accurate at
distinguishing between honest and dishonest statements than
people who were not as involved (low motivation to
scrutinize a message)
. The results of the study are
consistent with the idea that people engaging in uneffortful
processing pay attention to a range of behaviors (i.e.
nonverbal behaviors) that are highly predictive of deception
(Stiff et al., 1989), and therefore show an increase in
accuracy compared to those people that engage in effortful
processing and pay attention to the verbal aspects of the
message
.
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Current Study
To provide greater support for the notion that
uneffortful processing leads to better lie detection than
effortful processing derived from the dual processing model
for detecting deception, the current study investigates an
additional factor that would be expected to affect
processing: distraction. Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976)
investigated the effects of distraction on processing style,
and had participants engage in two tasks at the same time.
One task was a distraction task and the other task involved
attending to a recorded persuasive message. It was found
that at lower levels of distraction, messages that were
difficult to counter-argue were more persuasive than easy-
to-counter-argue messages. On the other hand, if
distracted, people were persuaded by difficult and easy
messages about the same, suggesting that people pay close
attention to the central arguments of a message at low
levels of distraction, while people experiencing higher
levels of distraction paid less attention to the arguments
relating to the issue. From this research. Petty and
Cacioppo (1986) concluded that in order to engage in
effortful processing, people must have the motivation and
the ability to do so. Consequently, if uneffortful
processing leads to better detection of deception, then
distractions that promote this type of processing should
also lead to increases in lie detection accuracy.
The proposed study largely replicated the Forrest and
Feldman (in press) study, except that distraction was used
instead of involvement to produce effortful and uneffortful
processing. A low distraction manipulation is expected to
permit effortful processing, and a high distraction
manipulation is expected to block the ability to attend to
the central arguments, and hence, provoke uneffortful
processing. If this happens, then, people in the high
distraction condition will be more accurate at
distinguishing between honest and dishonest statements
compared to people in the low distraction condition.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Overview
Groups of 6 to 12 judges viewed a stimulus videotap<
prepared for a previous study (Forrest and Feldman, in
press). The videotape consisted of 64 messages in which
half the target persons were female and half male, and half
the messages were honest statements and half were
dishonest
.
^
The judges rated the truthfulness of each target
person's message. Furthermore, the judges were instructed
to also pay attention to tones heard throughout the video,
and remember their pitch (high or low) until the end of each
clip. Distraction was manipulated by varying the number of
tones presented for each video clip. The high distraction
condition had 3 tones per clip, while the low distraction
condition had 1 tone per clip.
Targets
A total of 24 undergraduates were recruited and
recorded for the creation of the stimulus tapes, but two
participants did not consent to the release of the
^Target motivation was also manipulated by describing the
ability to make impressions on others as very important (high
motivation) , or not the focus of the session (low motivation) .
This manipulation was devised for the Forrest and Feldman
(submitted) study, and was not considered in the current study.
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recordings, and six targets did not follow the instructions
correctly. Attractiveness ratings were collected for the 16
remaining targets (half male, half female), because
researchers have found that people assume that attractive
targets are more honest than unattractive targets
(Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996). None of the
remaining 16 target persons was rated above or below 2
standard deviations from the mean, therefore, all were
employed to create the stimulus tapes. All target persons
received experimental credit for their participation.
Stimulus Material
Prior to the beginning of the recording session, each
target person had been asked their opinions on four
statements: (1) Nuclear power is not very safe; (2) The
government should put further restrictions on immigration;
(3) The death penalty should be instituted in all States;
and (4) There is too much violence on T.V. The targets were
instructed to communicate 4 messages to a person behind a
one-way mirror, and their responses were videotaped. The
targets were told that the study concerned people's ability
to make good impressions on others and they were asked to
give arguments supporting their opinion on two of the
issues, and supporting a counter-attitudinal stance in the
other two cases. Therefore, each target person communicated
10
two honest and two dishonest messages. The order in which
targets communicated the honest and dishonest messages was
random, as was the order of the issues.
From each of the target person's messages, the first
argument espoused for each of the issues was selected as the
stimulus message. The 64 resulting messages were edited
into four stimulus tapes approximately 26 minutes long,
consisting of 64 clips, each lasting approximately 15
seconds with a 10 second delay between each clip. All
target persons appeared on each of the stimulus tapes four
times, twice being honest, and twice being dishonest. Each
of the clips was randomly assigned a number from 1 to 64,
representing the position in the tape in which the clip
would be shown. The clips were edited into four stimulus
tapes, two of which showed the clips in the order of 1 to
64, and the others in the opposite order.
The distraction manipulation was edited into the tapes
by adding high or low pitch tones into the audio portion of
the videotapes. Two tapes (one with reversed ordering of
the clips) contained 1 tone per clip, while the other two
tapes (again, one of them having reversed order) contained 3
tones per clip. The pitch of the tones varied in random
fashion within each clip, as did the time lapse between one
tone and the next.
11
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Participants
A total of 89 participants (42 male, 47 female), whos.
first language was English, acted as the judges of honest
and dishonest messages in the stimulus tape. The
participants received experimental credit in their
introductory psychology classes for their participation in
this experiment.
Procedure
Groups of 6 to 12 participants, who acted as judges,
were given written instructions and response sheets. The
instructions described the study as an investigation into
the process of performing two tasks at the same time. There
were two sets of written instructions, one for each of the
distraction conditions. The written instructions stated
that judges would watch a videotape of people communicating
arguments about certain issues. The four issues presented
in the tape were provided in the instruction sheet. The
judges were also made aware that in the stimulus tape, the
targets might, in some cases, try to give false impressions,
and are therefore sometimes honest and sometimes dishonest.
In the first task, the judges were asked to rate each
target's truthfulness on a 9-point scale anchored at (1)
"very truthful" and (9) "very untruthful" after each clip.
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Judges were then told that a second task would be
performed at the same time as the videotape was being shown
and truthfulness ratings were being recorded. Judges were
instructed that the second task would consist of an auditory
perception test. They were instructed to listen to the
pitch (high or low) of either 1 tone (in the low distraction
condition) or 3 tones (in the high distraction condition),
remember the pitch of the tone(s), and record the pitch at
the end of each clip. After the judges had read the
instructions and the experimenter had answered any questions
regarding the procedure, sample tones were played to the
judges before the stimulus tape was started in order to
familiarize them with the auditory task.
One of the four stimulus tapes was then played. The
auditory distraction condition was chosen in advance but the
experimenter was not aware of which distraction condition
would be used until the moment the experimenter had to hand
the written instructions to the participants, and the
experiment was about to start. After the experiment
started, the experimenter went to the back of the room,
behind the participants.
After all 64 clips had been shown and judged,
manipulation checks were administered, where open-ended
questions and forced choice questions measured the effect of
13
the cognitive load on arguments recalled and overall
distraction. Specifically, participants were asked if "the
pitch of the tones was easy to remember", and if
"remembering the pitch of the tones made listening to the
arguments difficult." Furthermore, participants wrote down
the arguments they remembered hearing on the tapes for each
of the four different topics. They were given two minutes
for each of the four topics to recall the arguments given in
the tape.
14
CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Participants' ratings on the manipulation checks
revealed that people m the low distraction condition found
the tones easier to remember (M = 3.14) than participants in
the high distraction condition (M = 2.38), F(l,87) = 6.64, p
< .05. Participants in the high distraction condition,
compared to participants in the low distraction condition,
felt that that remembering the tones made paying attention
to the arguments more difficult (M = 4.49; M = 3.41
respectively), F(l, 87) = 8.01, p < .01.
The proportion of arguments recalled by the
participants was calculated by adding the number of
arguments the participants recalled and dividing by the
actual number of arguments in the tape. There were 41
different arguments throughout the tape; different target
persons repeat some of the arguments. For example, in the
immigration issue, four target persons argue that U.S.
citizens might loose their jobs because of lower paid
immigrants. Also, participants' answers were screened for
their accuracy, and false recalls were not added to
calculate the proportion. As predicted, participants in the
low distraction condition remembered a greater proportion of
15
the arguments (.44), than those in the high distraction
condition (.36), F(l,85) = 7.52, p < .01.
Design and General Results
A 2 (distraction: high, low) x 2 (^udge sex) x 2 (type
of message: honest, dishonest) x 2 (target sex) ANOVA was
used to analyze the data. Distraction and judge sex were
between subjects factors, and type of message and target sex
were within subjects factor.
^ The truthfulness ratings on
the 9-point scale were used as the dependent variable. The
judges were the units of analysis because of our interest in
the judges' processing style.
Some researcher have found that people, in general, are
able to significantly differentiate between honest and
dishonest messages (e.g., DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979), and
this study is congruent with those findings: There was a
significant main effect for type of message, F(l, 85) =
98.70, p < .001. The observers judged honest statements as
more truthful (M = 5.58) than dishonest statements (M =
5.033) .
preliminary analysis was conducted to examine whether the
order in which the clips were presented affected people's
attribution of truthfulness. Although an order x type of message
interaction was significant, F(l,81) = 5.51, p < .05, inspection
of the means involved in the interaction did not reveal a clear
pattern and there is no theoretical explanation for the finding.
16
An interaction effect between distraction and type of
message was expected, where the difference between
judgements of honest and dishonest messages for undistracted
Dudges should be smaller than the difference in judgements
for distracted judges. However, the data did not reveal the
expected pattern, F(l, 85) = 3.68 p < n.s. In fact,
inspection of the means revealed that the pattern of results
was contrary to the one expected (see Table 1)
.
Because the pattern of results contradicted
predictions, several exploratory analyses were conducted.
It is possible that the high distraction manipulation was
powerful enough to disrupt participants' ability to attend
to certain aspects of the message. To investigate this
possibility, an internal analysis was conducted across
experimental conditions. Correlations were computed between
the proportion of arguments recalled by participants and the
participants' accuracy scores. A participant's accuracy
score is the mean truthfulness rating for all the honest
target clips minus the mean truthfulness rating for all the
dishonest target clips. The higher the score, the more
accurate a participant was in differentiating between honest
and dishonest messages.
17
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Inspection of the scores revealed two outliers, both of
whom had accuracy scores four standard deviations above the
mean. Each also had high leverage, since one had recalled
significantly more arguments than average, and the other had
recalled a significantly lower number of arguments than
average. These two outliers were removed from the analysis.
A linear regression between accuracy score and
proportion of arguments recalled revealed no significant
linear relationship with zero percent of the variance
explained, F(l, 82) = .02, p = n.s. The possibility of a
curvilinear relationship was then investigated. It may be
argued that people with low recall and people with high
recall would be the worst detectors of deception, while
people with average recall would be the best detectors of
deception. Specifically, people with high recall of the
arguments presented might ignore nonverbal behaviors and
peripheral cues in order to concentrate on the central
aspect of the message. People with low argument recall may
not have been paying attention to much at all, therefore,
just as they neglected the arguments, they might also have
neglected nonverbal behaviors. These predictions are in
line with the suggestion that too much distraction may have
led to lower levels of accuracy in detecting deception
19
because levels of distraction that are too high should
interfere with the attention process.
Consistent with these arguments, it was found that a
regression with a quadratic model significantly accounted
for 7.7% of the variance, F(2,81) = 3.39, p < .05. People
with higher and lower recall of arguments were less accurate
in detecting deception than people with average recall of
arguments (see Figure 1) .
Gender Differences
The original analysis of variance identified some
gender differences in the detection of deception. A target
sex by type of message interaction was found in which judges
could distinguish between the honest and dishonest
statements told by target females (honest M = 5.91;
dishonest M = 4.87), but judges were unable to distinguish
between the statements told by target males (honest M =
5.28; dishonest M = 5.26), F(l, 85) = 71.35, p < .001. This
pattern was found for both men and women judges in a judge
sex X target sex x type of message interaction. Male and
female judges differentiated more easily between the honest
and dishonest statements of female targets, compared to male
target persons, F(l, 85) = 14.35 p < .001 (see Table 2).
Finally, a four-way judge sex x target sex x
distraction condition x type of message interaction was
20
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Male
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5.33 (.97) 00
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Female
Target
5.69 (1.00) 4.94 (1.01)
Female
Judge Male
Target
5.24 (.67) 5.369 (.85)
Female
Target
6.12 (1.00)
4.813 (.95)
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Dishonest
X
X
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means
m
found, F(l,85) = 5.32, p < .05. Inspection of the
found that both male and female judges in the low
distraction condition were better at detecting deception
female targets, than in male judges, but only female judges
in the high distraction condition were able to detect
deception accurately in female targets. When rating the
truthfulness of male targets, female judges could not
differentiate between the honest and dishonest message. In
fact, in general, they rated dishonest messages told by male
targets as more truthful than honest statements. On the
other hand, male judges could, to some degree, detect
deception in male targets (see Table 3)
.
23
Male
Judge
Male
Target 5.46 (.69) 5.23 (.73) 5.21 (1.19)
in o
Female
Target 5.95 (.86) 5.18 (1.04) 5.42 (1.07) 5.17 (1.13)
Female
Judge
Male
Target 5.33 (.58) 5.26 (.83) 5.12
(.75)
1
5.41 (.94)
Female
Target 6.14 (.92) 5.34 (.85) 6.09 (1.08) 5.17 (.90)
Type
of
Message
Honest
Dishonest
Honest
Dishonest
Distraction
Condition
Low High
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
This study found, as some previous studies have
(DePaulo and Rosenthal, 1979), that people in general can
distinguish between honest and dishonest statements.
However, while people could significantly distinguish
between honest and dishonest statements, the difference of
rated truthfulness for honest and dishonest statements was
not very large.
The main point of the current study was to investigate
how differences in processing styles might affect people's
accuracy in detecting deception. It was predicted that
people engaged in low elaboration processing would be more
accurate in detecting deception than people engaged in high
elaboration processing, because while engaged in low
elaboration processing a person is more likely to attend to
the nonverbal aspects of a message.
Unfortunately, the manipulations in this study did not
have the intended effects on people's accuracy at detecting
deception. Contrary to our predictions, people in the high
distraction condition were not more accurate at detecting
deception than people in the low distraction condition.
Nevertheless, evidence from the supplemental regression
analysis offers tentative support for the idea that amount
25
of argument recall affects people's detection of deception.
Furthermore, some gender differences in the accuracy of
detecting deception were found.
The distraction condition assigned to the participants
was not related to people's accuracy m distinguishing
between honest and dishonest messages. Further analyses
showed that the distraction condition predicted the
proportion of arguments that a person recalled from the
tapes, but the proportion of arguments recalled was not
related in a linear fashion to people's accuracy at
detecting deception. Instead, deception detection accuracy
and the proportion of arguments recalled were related in a
curvilinear fashion. The pattern of this relationship
showed that people who paid more of attention to the
arguments of a message (high recall) and those who paid
little attention to arguments (low recall) were not as
proficient in detecting deception than those people who gave
a moderate amount of attention to the arguments of a message
(average recall) .
These results suggest that the amount of attention a
person gives to the verbal component of a message (i.e. the
arguments) may, to some extent, determine people's accuracy
at detecting deception. In this case, if people recalled
most of the arguments or not enough of the arguments
26
presented to them, their accuracy at detecting deception
wasimparred. Taken together with previous studies (Forrest
and Feldman, in press; Stiff et al
. , 1989), this provides
tentative evidence for a process model of detecting
deception, in which a person's recall of the arguments
presented determine how accurate that person is in detecting
deception
.
The results of the study suggest that at some high
level of distraction, a person's interest and/or attention
in verbal and nonverbal behaviors is low, and therefore,
accuracy in detecting deception will also suffer. Although
people in this high distraction condition may be attending
to peripheral cues, as intended, they might be paying
attention to peripheral cues that are extremely easy to
perceive such as, for example, attractiveness. These
peripheral cues are not necessarily related to the
deceptiveness of the target person and therefore are of
little use when attempting to detect deception.
Further studies should be conducted in order to
understand the possible relationship between a person's
processing style when detecting deception and that person's
accuracy in making those judgements. High levels of
distraction may have impaired people's ability to attend to
the deceptive messages. Consequently, a study that
27
incorporates moderate levels of distraction should be
carried out to further test the hypotheses investigated in
this thesis. Because people in a moderate distraction
condition would be able to pay attention to peripheral cues
while also performing the distraction task, it would be
expected that people in a moderate distraction condition
will be more accurate in detecting deception than people in
low and high distraction conditions. This result would give
support to a dual-process model for detecting deception.
It might be argued that the differences found in
Forrest and Feldman (in press) and in the regressions
performed on the present study are due to differences in the
persuasiveness of the target persons' messages. That is,
when targets are being honest, they may be more or less
persuasive than when they are dishonest. However, initial
evidence contrary to this alternative explanation has been
found in a pilot study (Forrest, 1997) . In this pilot
study, judges rated the persuasiveness of target messages,
which were either honest or dishonest. Furthermore,
different judges rated the truthfulness of each of the
target messages. It was found that truthfulness ratings
were related to the persuasiveness of a message, but
persuasiveness did not vary as a function of the actual
honesty or dishonesty of the message. Therefore, these
28
initial data suggest that although people base some of their
judgements of deceptiveness of a message on the
persuasiveness of that message, this portion of the variance
does not explain the differences in deception detection
accuracy
.
The present study also found some gender differences.
One of these effects was a replication from a previous study
(Forrest & Feldman, in press) using the same target video.
Lies told by male targets were significantly more difficult
to detect compared to lies told by female targets. Although
it has been found that males are not as good as females at
communicating nonverbal facial expressions (Hall, 1984), the
evidence for men being better liars is quite mixed.
Although this finding is a replication from an earlier
finding, both studies used the same stimulus video,
therefore the finding lacks generalizability because the
effect could be a function of the specific target persons on
the video. Still, as suggested by DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang,
and O'Brien 1988
,
women, when placed in the task of being
deceptive, may be naturally more motivated to make a good
impression, and consequently worse at hiding their
dishonesty
.
In conclusion, this study provides tentative evidence
in support of a dual-process model of detecting deception,
29
but research incorporating more levels of distraction is
clearly needed in order to shed light on the processes at
work. In addition, it is important to understand what cues
people attend to when judging for deception in others. As
suggested earlier, people may base their attributions of
deception, at least in part, to the persuasiveness of the
message, but this effect should be more pronounced for
people engaged in high elaboration processing. People
engaged in peripheral processing attend to other aspects of
a message, and further research should investigate which
aspects of a specific message people attend to when engaged
in low elaboration processing.
30
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